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CALIFORNIA PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING JUDICIAL
DECREES BINDING ON UNBORN OR
UNASCERTAINED PERSONS
By Wmum J. ADms
Do principles of American justice prevent our courts from rendering
decisions which will affect the interests of persons not before the court?
Does efficient administration of justice demand that legal proceedings be
heard promptly, or must proceedings be postponed indefinitely out of deference to persons who may never exist? These are two of the questions which
faced the District Court of Appeals of California in 1945 in Moxley v. Title
Insurance and Trust Co.' In that case a testamentary trust had been established for the plaintiff by her mother. The trustees were to pay the income
to the plaintiff for her support, maintenance and education until she reached
the age of 35. When plaintiff reached 35 years of age, the trust estate and all
accumulations were to be paid to her. If plaintiff should die before reaching
35 years of age, the corpus was to be paid to her children, or if she had no
children, to her sister, or if her sister were then dead, to her sister's issue.
When the will creating the trust was executed, the plaintiff was a 15-year-old
school girl, living with her mother. It was contemplated by the trustor that the
plaintiff would live with and be supported by her father, if the mother should
die before plaintiff reached 35. Plaintiff's father and mother were both
dead when this action was brought, and the income from the trust was inadequate to support the plaintiff. The plaintiff, who was 26 years of age when
the action was brought, sought to have the trust so modified that she might
buy a home with the money. The court denied the requested relief because
such modification might be detrimental to the contingent interests limited to
plaintiff's unborn children. Plaintiff attempted to meet this objection by
petitioning for appointment of a guardian ad litern to represent the interests
of any child or children then unborn but which might be living at her death
before she reached 35. The court, citing Restatement of Property, sections
182 and 186, and Code of Civil Procedure sections 372 and 373, held (1)
that the action could not be maintained unless the contingent beneficiaries
were represented; (2) that the hostility of interests between plaintiff and the
contingent beneficiaries prevented representation of the latter by the trustee
or by the plaintiff; (3) that a guardian ad litem could not be appointed for
unborn persons in the absence of statutory authorization, and (4) that there
was no statutory authorization for such appointment in the State of California.
Soon after the decision in the Moxley case, the California Legislature
added section 373.5 to the Code of Civil Procedure. This section provides
1154 P.2d 417 (CaLApp. 1945) af'd 27 CaL2d 457, 165 P.2d 15 (1946) ; see note 163 A.L.R. 858.
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that a guardian ad litem may be appointed to represent the property interests
of unborn or unascertained persons in any action or proceeding affecting
such interests.
It is not the purpose of this comment to discuss the merits of the Moxley
case. That case and the cited code section are offered merely as introductory
examples of the procedural problems which can arise when interests are limited to unborn or unascertained persons, and of a possible solution to those
problems.
The fact situation which faced counsel in the Moxley case is not one
which arises frequently. When it does arise, however, it brings with it a
problem of judicial procedure. It is a rule as old as the law that no one shall
be personally bound until he has had his "day in court," by which is meant
until he has been duly summoned to appear, and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. 2 On the other hand, cases arise in which future interests in property are limited to persons who are unborn or who though living,
cannot be definitely ascertained until some time in the future; e.g., A grants
to B for life, remainder to B's children in fee, where B is as yet childless, or
A grants to B for life, remainder to the heirs of C, a living person. If a proceeding should be started in which the future interests limited to such unborn or unascertained persons would or might be affected, it would be impossible in many cases to serve notice upon or afford a hearing to such a
person. The problem, briefly stated, is this: How, then, may a binding decree or judgment be framed with due regard for the interests of the unborn
or unascertained persons?
Section 373.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is obviously not the only
solution to this problem, since the California lawyer could not have been
powerless for a full century to maintain actions involving this type of queston. A review of the avenues of procedure open to the California lawyer
faced with this apparent dilemma should be of interest to the practitioner
as well as to the legal scholar and student. Due to limitations of space and
time, this discussion will be limited to situations involving future interests
in real property, though the rules in many instances are equally applicable
to similar interests in personalty. Because of the same restrictions of space
and time, the similar problem presented by cases involving excessively numerous parties ("class suits") will not be discussed here.3
The problem of unborn or unascertained future interest owners may
arise in a wide variety of cases. A partial enumeration includes eminent
domain proceedings, quiet title actions, actions for partition or to recover
'Crapster v. Taylor, 74 Kan. 771, 87 Pac. 1138 (1906), Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350
(1874)
'See Carey v. Brown, 58 Cal. 180 (1881), Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Association,
32 Cal.2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948), CALIF. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 382; FED. R. Civ. P 23.
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for waste, suits for specific performance of contracts for the sale of land,
and many others. A complete enumeration is unnecessary.
Joinder of Presumptive Takers.
In some of the situations involving this problem, a sure and obvious
solution is provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 1908(2), which provides that a judgment by a court having jurisdiction to render it is conclusive
as between the parties, provided they have notice of the pendency of the
action or proceeding. This would be applicable in a situation such as this:
A grants Blackacre to B for life, remainder to the heirs of C. An action to
quiet title, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 738, is brought by
X, to whom B has purportedly granted Blackacre in fee. If C were alive at
the time of the action, the remaindermen would be unascertained, since no
one is the heir of a living person. However, if C had two children, D and E,
they could be joined as parties defendant by plaintiff X under the provisions
of section 738, being prospective heirs of C and therefore presumptive takers
under the grant from A. Under section 1908(2) the judgment would be
binding on D and E.4 If only one of the children was joined, however, the
judgment would not be binding on the other.5 As to the binding effect of
the decree on other persons, later born, etc., who might become the heirs
of C upon his death, see the discussion of representation below.
Actions in Rem.
Another situation in which the problem as to the binding effect of a
judgment against unborn or unascertained persons is quickly solved is where
the action is one directed against the property itself-an action purely in
rem. This is perhaps not so much a solution to the problem as an avoidance
of it. An action purely in rem is one in which the judgment conclusively
determines all interests in the res or subject matter of the action. Often the
court has jurisdiction to render this judgment whether or not the owners of
the various interests are before the court. Such actions are best exemplified
by proceedings in admiralty, forfeitures under pure food and drug laws,
seizures of contraband chattels and similar actions. They rarely involve future interests in real property. Where an action in rem does involve real
property, there is usually some requirement for notice of the action to be
given to persons interested in the res.
Perhaps the best example of an action in rem in California is the adverse possessor's suit against known and unknown claimants, provided by
'Akley v. Bassett, 68 Cal.App. 270, 228 Pac. 1057 (1924),
Pac. 803 (1926).

Hunt v. Lawton, 76 Cal.App. 655, 245

'Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 523, 60 Pac. 442, 64 Pac. 1000 (1901), Akley v. Bassett, 189 Cal. 625,

209 Pac. 576 (1922) ; County of Los Angeles v. Winans, 13 CalApp. 234, 109 Pae. 640 (1910).
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Code of Civil Procedure sections 749-751.1.6 These code sections set forth
the requisites for a suit to determine all adverse claims to real property.
Among the requisites is service of notice of the proceedings (1) to all persons who appear on record as having claims against the property, (2) to all
persons known to plaintiff to have claims on the property and (3) to all other
persons unknown, claiming any interest in the property. The unknown defendants may be served by the posting of the summons on the property described in the complaint and publication in a daily or weekly newspaper of
general circulation in the county where the property is situated. Section 751.1
provides that the judgment shall be final as against all unknown persons who
have been served by publication and shall have the effect of a judgment in
rem. As an example, if A should grant to B for life, remainder in fee to the
children of C who survive B, and if X, fulfilling all the requirements of the
statute were to bring an action under Code of Civil Procedure section 749
or 749.1, a decree in such an action would be effective as a decree in rem. If
at the time of the action C had two children, D and E, whose identity or existence was unknown to T, the decree would be binding on D and E under the
provisions of section 751.1. The decree would also be binding on any later
born children of C, either directly under the provisions of section 751.1 or
by the virtual representation doctrine discussed below.'
Another action in rem, added to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1953, is
the action to re-establish destroyed land records, found in sections 751.01751.28. Based on the McEnerney Act of 1906,8 these code sections provide
an action in rem to establish the title to land, the public records of which
have been lost or destroyed. The defendants in this action are named as "all
persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described," and notice is served on all such persons by the posting of the summons on the property and by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county. When such notice is given, the court has jurisdiction over
the property, over the plaintiff and over the person of all who answer the
description as defendant. The effect of the decree is a final determination of
all interests in the property. In the absence of extrinsic fraud or mistake9
such determination is conclusive against all persons who claimed any interest
at the commencement of the action. It is conclusive against parties who were
not in being at the time of the action and could not, therefore, have received
even constructive notice of the action. 10
Other actions in rem in this state include decrees ordering registration
'Characterized in County of Los Angeles v. Winans, supra note 5, as "the only proceeding
purely in rem- given by the statutes of this state for the determination of rights in real property
"
of persons whose interests are unknown.
'See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 182, comment I (1936), PATTON, LAND TITLES § 257 (1938)
'CALIF. STATS. 1906, c. 59, as amended; repealed, CALIF. STATS. 1953, c. 52.
'Boyle v. Boyle, 97 Cal.App. 703, 276 Pac. 118 (1929)
"Crittenden v. Dorn, 274 Fed. 520 (9th Cir. 1921).
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under the Land Title Law," probate decrees distributing decedents' estates,"1
judgments under the Wright Act for organization of irrigation districts, '
and judgments under some older statutes for collection of taxes and street
assessments. 4 Actions to quiet title under Code of Civil Procedure section
738 and actions for foreclosure of various statutory liens are actions in
personam, not in rem.'"
Unknown Owner Statutes.
Another remedy available in limited cases to the California lawyer is
the so-called unknown owner statute, as found in Code of Civil Procedure,
title X, chapter 4, particularly sections 753, 756, 757, 766. These sections
provide for joinder of unknown owners in partition actions by the posting
and publication of the summons, as outlined above in the discussion of the
similar provisions in the statutory actions in rem. These statutory provisions
are separately discussed because of apparent inconsistency in other jurisdictions as to their operation. Professor Simes suggests that unknown owner
statutes are merely a means by which the court acquires jurisdiction to issue
a decree operating in rem.' 6 This would seem to be the correct analysis in
those cases involving statutory actions in rem, such as Code of Civil Procedure sections 749-751.1, discussed above. The binding effect of the decree
in such an action, however, at least against unborn persons, is achieved because the action is in rem, not because of theoretical joinder of unknown
owners.
While no authority is found, the partition action under Code of Civil
Procedure sections 752 et seq. would seem to be an action in-personam. The
phrasing of section 766, as to the conclusiveness of the judgment seems to
indicate that this is an action in personam, even though binding on unborn
persons.' The binding effect of the decree, then, is achieved because of
theoretical joinder of the unknown owner as a party to the action. In Weberpals v. Jeny'8 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a somewhat similar
unknown owner statute referred only to persons in being. The effect of the
statute was held to be joinder of unknown living persons who had interests
in the property. The decree was therefore binding on those persons. The
statute was held not to join as parties any unborn persons; therefore, in the
"CALIF. STATS. 1915, p. 1932 [Initiative Act adopted November 3, 1914]; DEERINo GENERAL
LAWs, 1931, Act 8589. See particularly sections 13, 16, 45.
"CALIF. PROB. CODE §§ 1021, 1054; CALIF. CODE CIv. Poc. § 1908 (1).
"CALIF. STATS. 1887, c. 34, repealed and reenacted m CALIF. WATER CODE, CALIF. STATS. 1943,
c. 368; Crall v. Poso Irrigation District, 87 Cal. 140, 26 Pac. 797 (1890).
"'CALIF. STATS. 1861, c. 401; CALIF. STATS. 1863, c. 308, §§ 49, 55, 58.
'See 1 CAL. JUR. 323; 15 CAL. JUa. 233.
"SImEs, FuTRE INTERESTS § 675 (1936) ; see also PATTON, LAND TITLES §§ 257, 307.
"'See text, section on Judicial Sale and Remvestment, infra.

18300 laL 145, 133 N.E. 62 (1921).
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absence of applicability of the virtual representation doctrine unborn persons were not bound by the decree.
The weakness of lack of binding effect against unborn parties is cured
in California by a clause in Code of Civil Procedure section 766 providing
for such binding effect if the economic interests of the unborn persons are
protected by the decree. 9 By compliance with the statutory requirements set
out in the unknown owner provisions of section 752 et seq., a partition action
may be maintained in California in cases where future interests are limited
to a class of unborn or unascertained persons.
Judicially Ordered Sale and Re-Investment.
Another procedure apparently available in California, though no case
authority is found to verify it, is that exemplified by two leading cases,
Gavin v. Curtin2" and Coquillardv. Coquillard.2 1 The factual situation presented by these cases may be epitomized as follows: A owns a tract of pasture land near a rapidly expanding city. He devises an undivided half of the
tract to his daughter B for life, remainder in fee to those children of B who
survive her, but if B die without issue her surviving, then to C and his heirs.
The other undivided half of the tract, he devises to his son C in fee. The city
expands until it surrounds the tract. Taxes and assessments for streets and
sewers increase to $300 per annum. The income from the tract, still being
used as pasture land, is $50 per annum. The tract is ideal for subdivision,
and offers have been made by a development company to buy the tract for
$100,000. B and C, the only living owners of the tract are both eager to sell,
since this will provide them with income-producing capital. Neither is willing
to continue paying the prohibitive taxes, and the property will inevitably be
lost by tax foreclosure unless something is done soon. The obstacle preventing the sale is that B has no children, therefore no person may consent to
the sale of the contingent remainder. B and C seek the help of a court of
equity. Happily, the courts are able to provide a solution for this problem.
In both of the leading cases cited above, the courts held that where emergencies arise rendering court action imperative, in order to protect the economic interests of all the parties, a court of equity has the power to order
a sale in fee of lands held by a life tenant with contingent estates limited to
unborn persons. This power, it was cautioned, must be exercised only within
the limits of necessity, but where exercised, and where proceeds are so invested or distributed as to protect the proper share of the contingent owners,
the decree will be binding on persons not in being.
Apparently no such drastic case has arisen in California, but if one
19

See note 17 supra.
20171 Ill. 640, 49 N.E. 523 (1898)
"162 Ind.App. 426, 113 N.E. 474 (1916), 62 Ind.App. 489, 113 N.E. 481 (1916)
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should arise, it would be well met by provisions in Code of Civil Procedure
sections 752, 763, 766 (2) and 781, referred to in the discussion of unknown
owner statutes, above. These sections would seem to be a statutory enactment
of the doctrine expressed in Gavin v. Curtin and Coquillardv. Coquillard,
but with emphasis more on protection of the interests of unborn persons than
on strict necessity of immediate action. By section 763, in an action for
partition of land held by a life tenant with a contingent remainder in fee, the
court must order sale of the property. Section 766 (2) provides that a judgment in the partition action under sections 752 et seq. shall be conclusive
and binding
" . .. on all persons not in being at the time said judgment is entered, who
have any interest in the property divided . , . as entitled to the reversion,
remainder or the inheritance of such property . . . ; provided, that in case
sale has been made under the provisions of this chapter the judgment shall
provide for keeping intact the share of the proceeds of said sale, to which
said party or parties not in being at the time are or may be entitled until
such time as such party or parties may take possession thereof."

Section 781 outlines more specifically. the methods for keeping intact
the unborn person's share. The drafters of our code have apparently foreseen the possibility of the drastic hypothetical case stated above, and have
made available a remedy for it.22
Representation--Generally.
The most practical solution available to the attorney with a case involving future interests limited to unborn or unascertained persons is the application of the doctrine of representation. This is the doctrine which will be
available in the greatest number of cases. The theory on which this doctrine
rests is that where it is manifestly impossible or impractical to have before
the court the actual person whose interests will be affected, it will be sufficient that some other person be before the court whose presence will assure
an adequate presentation of the case which the represented person would
have presented had he been able to appear. This doctrine may conveniently
be analyzed by making two distinct categories. In the first are those cases
where the person before the court (the representative) is under a legal duty
adequately to represent the interests of the unborn or unascertained (represented) person. Examples of this are (1) representation of the beneficiary of
a trust by the trustee, and (2) representation of a ward by a guardian or
guardian ad litem. In the second category are those cases where self-interest
rather than legal duty assures sufficient protection of the interests of the
"See language generally in accord, County of Los Angeles v. Winans, supra note 5; Garside v.
PATTON, LAND TITLEs §§ 257, 260, 261.

Garside, 80 CaLApp.2d 318, 181 P.2d 665 (1947) ; see also,
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represented person. This is the virtual representation doctrine. An example
of this category would be a case in which a remainder in fee is limited to a
class, some members of which are in being, but with the possibility that
others will be later born, thereby increasing the class. If the living members
of the class are joined as parties to an action affecting the fee, the defense
which they will present in order to protect the interest presently owned by
them will necessarily be the same defense which the unborn members of the
class would have presented, had they been able to do so. The decree is therefore binding on all living members of the class who are joined, and on all
unborn members.
Representation Based on Economic Self-Interest.
The expression "virtual representation doctrine" is used in reference
to cases involving future interests limited to unborn or unascertained persons
and also in reference to class suits, where one or several members of a large
class sue or are sued on behalf of all members of the class.2" The discussion
of the doctrine considered here will not encompass class suits.2" The virtual
representation doctrine has two fundamental requisites: (1) Impracticability
of actually joining as a party the represented person, and (2) self-interest
of the representative, who has an interest in the property so similar to the
interest of the person he represents that in protecting his own interests he
will adequately protect the interests of the person he represents.2 5
The doctrine of virtual representation has long been an accepted part of
California common law." As stated in Garside v. Garside2" the virtual representation rule in this state is substantially the same as the rule announced
in the Restatement of Property.2" It is convenient to follow the Restatement's
analysis of the rule by discussing separately (1) representation of unborn
persons and (2) representation of living persons. At this point it should be
noted that a person conceived but not yet born at the time an action is started
is considered a person not in being for purposes of this rule. The California
annotations to the Restatement of Property, prepared by learned authorities
under the auspices of the State Bar of California, state that Civil Code sec2320

CAL. JuR. 483.

"See note 3 supra.
"County of Los Angeles v. Winans, supra note 5; see also Unborn Parttes zn Property Litigation,
48 HARv. L. REV. 1001 (1935), Roberts, Virtual Representation in Actwns Affecting Future Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 580 (1936)
"County of Los Angeles v. Winans, supra note 5, Curran v. Pecho Ranch and Stock Co., 95
CaLApp. 555, 273 Pac. 126 (1928) ; Mabry v. Scott, 51 Cal.App.2d 245, 124 P.2d 659 (1942), Garside v. Garside, 80 Cal.App.2d 318, 181 P.2d 665 (1947) In regard at least to class suits itis also
recognized by statute-CALIF. CODE; CIv. PROC. § 382.
780 Cal.App.2d 318, 181 P.2d 665 (1947).
"RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

§§ 181(b), 182(a), 183, 184(a), (b), (c), (d), 185 (1936)
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tion 2929 is presumably not contrary to Restatement section 180 comment d,
which announces this rule."°

Representation of Unborn Persons.
A judicial proceeding has binding effect as against the future interest
limited in favor of a person who was unborn at the commencement of such
proceeding when such person was duly represented in such proceeding by a
person duly joined as a party to the proceeding."1 Sufficient representation exists (1) when the party who is joined and the unborn person sustain to each
other such a relationship that an adequate presentation of the legal position
of the party joined would be an adequate presentation of the legal position
of the unborn party; and (2) the judgment, decree or other result of such
proceeding operates with equal regard for the possible interests of the person
of the
joined as a party and of the unborn person; and (3) the conduct
2
party joined constitutes sufficient protection as outlined below.
The relationship which must exist between the representative and the
represented person is outlined in the Restatement section 184. The relationship is sufficient if the person joined as a party is one member of a class in
favor of which an interest in land is limited in such manner that the class can
increase its membership by the birth of the unborn person, whether or not
the class can decrease its membership by the death of the person so joined.
For example, assuming that the other requisites for representation are present, the unborn person would be sufficiently represented in the following
cases by joining C as a party: (1) A grants to B for life, remainder in fee
to the children of B. B has one child, C. (2) A grants to B for life, remainder
in fee to those children of B who survive him. B has one child, C. (3) A
grants to B for life, remainder in fee to those children of B who survive him.
B has two children, C and D. (4) A grants to B for life, remainder to the
heirs of X. C is a presumptive heir of X. (5) A grants to B and his heirs, but
if B die without issue surviving him then to the children of X in fee. X has
one child, C.
By these examples, it is shown (1) that the relationship is sufficient
where the party is joined as a member of a class of which the unborn person
may become a member, (2) that this rule applies whether the interest limited
to the class is vested, contingent or executory, (3) that it applies to the unborn
person even though some other members of the class may not be bound."
""A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person, so far as may be
necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth. .. "
"'See Daubert v. Western Meat Co., 139 Cal. 480, 73 Pac. 244 (1903), apparently in accord.
See also 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 4.88 (Casner, 1952) ; 1 SiaEs, op. cit. supra note 16, § 103;
3 SIMES, op. ct. supra note 16, § 686.
"RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 182(a) (1936).

"'RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 183 (1936).
"County of Los Angeles v. Winans, supra note 5; Curran v. Pecho Ranch and Stock Co., supra
note 26; 1 AMERmcAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 4.85, 4.87.
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The relationship is sufficient if the person joined as a party is the owner
of the first vested estate of inheritance in the land, and the interest limited
in favor of the unborn person will become possessory, if at all, in defeasance
of or subsequent to the estate of the person joined. For example: A devises
"to my son C in fee, but if C ever refuses to live on the premises, then to the
children of C in fee, or if C has no children living at the time of such refusal,
to D and his heirs." C has no children. If an action involving the fee were
begun, joinder of C as a party would result in binding effect of the decree
as against any later born children of C.34 Another example: A grants to B
for life, remainder in fee to the first son of B to reach 21 years of age. B has
no sons. A as owner of the reversion, could represent the unborn children of
B. The relationship stated in this paragraph is also sufficient to bar unborn
remaindermen in fee after an estate tail where such estates still exist.3"
According to the Restatement, the relationship is sufficient if the person
joined has an estate for life and the future interest in question is limited to
the unborn issue of the person joined. 6 It is suggested that the rule announced by the Restatement is unnecessarily restricted to family relationship rather than similarity of economic interests. A better statement of the
rule would be that the relationship is sufficient for representation of unborn
remaindermen, where the person joined has an estate for life and there are
no living remaindermen. As analyzed by Professor Lewis Simes in 1 American Law of Property section 4.82-4.90, the basis of the virtual representation
doctrine is similarity of economzc interests of the representative and the
represented person in the outcome of the litigation. While most of the cases
involving this question are cases which would come within the Restatement
rule, the basis for decision in those cases is similarity of economic interest
rather than blood relationship. The essential difference between the rule as
announced by the Restatement and the better rule suggested by Professor
Simes may be shown by these two examples: (1) A grants to B for life, remainder in fee to the children of B. B has no children. (2) A grants to B
for life, remainder in fee to the children of C. C, who is not related by blood
or marriage to B, has no children. In the first example, the Restatement rule
would apply. B could represent the unborn remaindermen. In the second
example the Restatement rule would not apply. B could not represent the
unborn remaindermen. The better rule would apply in either example.3 "
California cases referring to this rule have made reference to the requirement of blood relationship."
"There is a line of authority which appears to hold that D (a living person) would also be
bound.5 The fallacy of this apparent holding is pointed out in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.90.
" County of Los Angeles v. Winans, supra note 5.
6
" RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 184(d) (1936)
3
See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.87 for complete discussion with extensive case citations.
"8Gray v. Smith, 76 Fed. 525 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896), County of Los Angeles v. Winans, supra
note 5, Mabry v. Scott and Garside v. Garside, supra note 26.
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Other relationships deemed by the Restatement to be sufficient are: (1)
where the person joined is the presumptive taker of an estate of inheritance,
which although not a vested estate of inheritance, is so limited that the unborn person may take as the substitute for the person joined, and (2) where
the person joined is the donee of a power of appointment and the unborn
person is a permissible object of such power. An example of the first of these
would be a devise to B for life, remainder in fee to the nephews of the devisor who survive B, with the issue of deceased nephews taking their parent's share. Any of the devisor's nephews could represent his own unborn
children even though such children might be substituted for the nephew as
remaindermen. No California cases are found as authority for the sufficiency
of the two relationships stated in this paragraph. In view of the acceptance
of the rules on representation announced in the Restatement, as shown in
Garside v. Garside it would seem that California courts would accept these
two relationships in proper cases.
The second requisite of sufficient representation of an unborn person
is that the decree or judgment operate with equal regard for the interests of
the representative and the represented person. This does not mean that the
interests of representative and represented must receive identical treatment,
since their property interests may be different, as where a life tenant represents unborn remaindermen in fee. It does mean that a finding favorable to
the representative must be favorable also to the represented person, or conversely that an adverse holding must be adverse to both interests. Apparently
no California cases have ruled directly on this point. Language suggesting
accord with this, rule may be found in at least three cases.3 9 Several cases
have held that a life tenant or life tenant and one of a class of remaindermen
could not have a trust terminated where there is a possibility of further
members being born into the class of remaindermen.4 9 These cases based
the denial of relief on the fact that all parties were not before the court. No
mention was made of the virtual representation doctrine. It could be inferred
from these holdings that the courts refused to invoke the virtual representation doctrine, either because of adverse interests of the representatives or
because. of the rule discussed here, that the requested decree would not
operate with equal regard to interests of representative and represented.
The third requisite of sufficient representation of an unborn person is
that the conduct of the representative must constitute sufficient protection of
the interests of the unborn person. The rule as to what conduct constitutes
9
Gray v. Smith, supra note 38; County of Los Angeles v. Winans, supra note 5; Mabry v. Scott,
supra note 26.
'"Gray v. Umon Trust Co. of San Francisco, 171 Cal. 637, 154 Pac. 306 (1915), Fletcher v.
Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 187 Pac. 425 (1920) ; Woestman v. Union Trust
& Savings Bank, 50 CaLApp. 604, 195 Pac. 944 (1920) But cf. Mabry v. Scott, supra note 26.
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sufficient protection applies equally to representation of unborn persons and
to representation of living persons. For ease of organization the rule will be
analyzed here and mentioned only briefly in the discussion of representation
of living persons. The conduct of the person joined as a party constitutes
sufficient protection for the representation of living or unborn persons whenever it does not appear affirmatively that such person acted in hostility to
the interest of the person claimed to have been represented by him." In the
absence of proof of any other facts, sufficient protection would presumably
be shown merely by a showing that the representative was joined as a party. 2
The representation is not voided merely by the fact that the representative
consented to the judgment," nor by the fact that the representative was himself represented by a guardian ad litem," nor, according to the Restatement,4 5
by the fact that the representative did not bring out all the pertinent facts and
contentions, or that the representative was negligent, ignorant, an infant or a
lunatic. All of these facts, however, may be useful as evidence to prove
affirmative hostility. Affirmative hostility is shown by proof of extrinsic
fraud or collusion by the purported representative, 46 or the fact that the purported representative claimed an interest adverse to the interest of the purportedly represented person.4
Representation of Living Persons.
The situations in which the virtual representation doctrine will be held
to apply to living persons are more limited than those involving unborn persons. The requirements, as announced in Restatement of Property section
181 (b) and (c), are these: (1) that the interest of the represented person
be created by a limitation indefinite as to person, (2) that at the time of
commencement of the judicial proceeding, the represented person not be a
presumptive taker under the limitation, (3) that at least one of the presumptive takers under the limitation be joined as a party, and (4) that the conduct
of the presumptive taker constitute sufficient protection, as discussed above, or
(5) that the represented person be a permissible object of a power of ap.
pointment, the donee of which is joined as a party. The first four requisites
must be present concurrently for the doctrine to apply. The fifth requisite is
a separate situation in which the doctrine may apply.
"RESTATEMENT,

PROPERTY § 185 (1936).

"'Curran v. Pecho Ranch and Stock Co., supra note 26.
"Curran v. Pecho Ranch and Stock Co. and Mabry v. Scott, supra note 26.
"Ibid.
"RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 185, comment b (1936).
"Gray v. Smith, supra note 38; Curran v. Pecho Ranch and Stock Co., Mabry v. Scott, and
Garside v. Garside, supra note 26.
"'County of Los Angeles v. Winans, supra note 5; Estate of Benziger, 61 CaLApp.2d 628, 143
P.2d 717 (1943) ; Moxley v. Title Insurance and Trust Co., supra note 1. See also cases cited note
40 supra; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 185, comment d (1936).
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Examples of limitations indefinite as to persons are limitations to the
"heirs" or "next of kin" or "surviving spouse" of a living person. These are
classes in which there may be one or more persons who would match the
description if the contingent event were to occur at once, but those persons
might not be the same as those who will match the description when the event
actually does occur. The persons who would match the description if the
event were to occur at any given time are the presumptive takers at that time.
At least one of the presumptive takers must be joined as a party or the other
persons, who match the description when the contingency does occur, will
not be-bound under this rule. No presumptive taker is bound under this rule
unless joined.4"
The alternative situation-by which a person who is a permissible object of a power of appointment is bound by the judgment or decree in a
proceeding to which the donee of the power is made a party-was added to
the Restatement in the 1948 Supplement. A permissible object of a power of
appointment does not have a future interest as that term is normally used.49
He may, however, have an expectancy of sufficient economic value to be the
subject of litigation. 0 The basis for the rule is that the expectant appointee
takes, if at all, by the volition of the donee of the power. Obviously, protection by the donee of his interest will provide sufficient protection for the possible interest of the expectant appointee. 1
For a considerable period of time, doubt existed in California as to the
validity of powers of appointment. 2 This doubt stemmed from uncertain
judicial interpretation of the effect of the repeal of a Title of the Civil Code5 '
dealing with powers." The validity of such powers has been assumed in other
cases,55 however, and all doubt should be dispelled by the holding in Estate
of Sloan, 6 which ruled directly on the point and decided that powers of appointment are a part of California common law." While no cases are found
directly deciding the question, the rule that an expectant appointee is bound
'"See note 5 supra.
"Smss, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURn INTERESTS § 54 (Hornbook series 1951); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 153 (1) (a), (b) (1936).
"'Botzum v. Havana Nat'1 Bank, 367 Ill. 539, 12 N.E.2d 203 (1938) ; Brown v. Fidelity Union
Trust Co., 126 NJ.Eq. 406, 9 A.2d 311 (1939); see Roberts, Virtual Representation in Actions
Affecting Future Interests, 30 ILL..L REv. 580, 585 (1936).
"RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 181 (a) (1948).
"Estate of Murphy, 182 Cal. 740, 190 Pac. 46 (1920) ; 21 CAL Jun. 428; Dunne, Powers of
Appointment in California, 13 CALIF. L. Rav. 1 (1924).
"CArIF. CIv. CODE §§ 878-940, enacted March 21, 1872; repealed CALIF. STATs. 1873-74, p. 223.
"Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 523, 60 Pac. 442, 64 Pac. 1000 (1901) ; Estate of Murphy, supra note 52.
"'Gray v. Umon Trust Co. of San Francisco, supra note 40; Estate of Murphy, supra note 52;
Estate of Bowditch, 189 Cal. 377, 208 Pac. 282 (1922).
"'7 Cal.App.2d 319, 46 P.2d 1007 (1935).
"'See also Estate of Davis, 13 Cal.App.2d 64, 56 P.2d 584 (1936) ; Berdan v. Berdan, 39 Cal.
App.2d 478, 103 P.2d 622 (1940).
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where the donee of the power is joined would very probably be followed by
the California courts.
The question of whether unborn or living but unascertained persons are
bound by a judicial proceeding may be raised at the time of the original
proceeding or may be raised by the subsequently born or ascertained person
in a later proceeding of similar or different nature by way of collateral
attack on the original proceeding. The virtual representation doctrine is
especially valuable when the issue is raised in later proceedings, since it is
too late then to comply with unknown owner statutes or have a guardian ad
litem appointed for the earlier proceeding.
If a future interest limited in favor of an unborn or unascertained person should fail before such person is born or ascertained, it is of course
immaterial whether he was represented or not in an earlier proceeding in
which he should have been represented. A later proceeding attempting to
claim the interest would fail."
Representation Based on Legal Duty.
Representatwn of Beneficzary by Trustee-A trustee is under a duty
to the beneficiary to defend actions which may result in a loss to the trust
estate, unless under all the circumstances it is reasonable not to make such
defense.5 9 Under certain conditions, a trustee is under a duty to bring actions
against third parties, e.g., to collect claims owing to the trust, to obtain or
recover possession of trust property, to eject an adverse possessor." In actions
by or against the trustee, is the beneficiary a necessary party? The earlier
rule in courts of equity was that the beneficiary was always a necessary party,
but this rule has given way to a modern tendency to extend the trustee's powers to represent the beneficiary in actions involving the trust. 1 Where a
trustee in the performance of its duties is called upon to defend the interests
of the beneficiary, it may do so without the necessity of having the beneficiaries joined as parties defendant, provided the trustee acts in good faith
and its own interests are not in conflict with those of the beneficiary. The
beneficiary will be bound by the decree in such an action. 62 Stated another
way, the trustee may represent the beneficiary in all actions relating to the
"SBeam v. Gilkey, 225 N.C. 520, 35 S.E.2d 641 (1945).
"Estate of Dufill, 188 Cal. 536, 206 Pac. 42 (1922), Johnson v. Curley, 83 Cal.App. 627, 257
Pac. 163 (1927), Dingwell v. Seymour, 91 Cal.App. 483, 267 Pac. 327 (1928), RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 178 (1935), 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 581, 582 (1951)
00
Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 683 (1858), RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §§ 175-177 (1935), 3 BOGERT, Op.
cit. supra note 59, §§ 582, 583.
13 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 59, § 593.

"2Johnson v. Curley, 83 Cal.App. 627, 257 Pac. 163 (1927),
Trust Co., 48 CaLApp.2d 488, 119 P.2d 992 (1941)

Alexander v. Title Insurance &
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trust, if the rights of the beneficiary as against the trustee or the rights of
the beneficiaries among themselves, are not brought into question.6" The very
nature of a trust implies a power in the trustee to represent the beneficiaries
in actions by or against a third party.6 4
Assuming that the trustee may represent the beneficiary, the next question is: Can an unascertained person or an unborn person be the beneficiary
of a trust? The question is not so pressing if there are living, ascertained
beneficiaries and the unborn or living but unascertained persons will merely
augment the class of beneficiaries when such persons are born or ascertained.
In such a case, the existing beneficiaries clearly may be represented by the
trustee, and persons who later become beneficiaries should take the benefits
of the trust as they find them. This situation adds but little to the problem,
since either the later born or ascertained person had no interest at the time
of the proceeding, therefore cannot complain of any loss, or, if he is deemed
to have had an interest, it would be as a beneficiary, therefore he was represented. The more vital problem arises where the limitation creating the trust
is so worded that the only designated beneficiary is an unborn or unascertained person. For example: (1) A grants Blackacre to T and his heirs in
trust to pay the rents and profits to the first son of A. A has no children.
(2) A grants Blackacre to T and his heirs in trust to pay the rents and profits
,o any aftertaken wife of A. A is a bachelor. The question here is not whether
T may represent the unborn son of A or the unascertained wife of A. The
question is whether a trust has been created. By the rule announced in the
Restatement of Trusts, the two examples given above would be effective to
create valid present trusts.6 5 By the rule announced in the Restatement of
Property, the trustee could represent the beneficiaries in the trusts so created.66
The Restatement view, then, is that a trust may be created for the sole benefit
of unborn or unascertained persons, and that the trustee may represent such
persons in actions not involving conflicting interests of trustee and beneficiary.
Modem judicial policy, however, is more in support of the doubt expressed by Professor Bogert. He points out that:
" . . . a trust involves rights and duties with regard to the disposition
of property. But all legal relations necessarily imply the existence of two or

more persons. How then can the trustee for an unborn child be under express
,67
trust duties when there is no one In whom the correlative rights can vest?"
:"3 BOGERT,
8'3

op. cit. supra note 59, § 593.

BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 59, § 592.

85

Estate of Davm, 13 CaLApp.2d 64, 56 P.2d 584 (1936) ; Estate of Harrison, 22 CaiApp.2d

28, 70 P.2d 522 (1937) ; RESTATEMENT, TausTs § 112, comments c, d (1935).
00
Gray v. Unfon Trust Co. of San Francisco, supra note 40; CAu. CODE CiV. PRoc. § 369;
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 181(a), 186 (1936).
.'IA BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 59, § 163.
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The few cases which have stated or implied that an unborn person can
be the sole beneficiary of a trust may be explained on more logical grounds."
One of the logical analyses suggested is that an attempt to create a trust for
an unborn person might be treated as creating a resulting or express trust
for the settlor or his successors until the expected child is born or the possibility of his birth passes, with an express trust for the child springing up
when and if such child ever materializes. 9
The same reasoning would seem to apply in the case of an attempted
creation of a trust for a future wife of a bachelor. In Morsman v. Comissioner of Internal Revenue70 it was held that no trust was created where a
bachelor declared himself trustee of certain securities for himself, his possible aftertaken wife, possible afterborn children, and his heirs.
If it should be decided that a trust is created with an unborn or unascertamed person as its sole beneficiary, then the rule that a trustee may represent the beneficiaries would control."i If it should be decided that an attempt
to create such a trust would create instead a resulting trust in the settlor, then
the settlor would be represented by the trustee and might in turn represent
the unborn or unascertained person. If it should be decided that an attempt
to create such a trust is a nullity, then no question of representation of the
unborn or unascertained person is presented.
Representationby Guardianor GuardianAd Litem-Discussions of the
law of guardianship normally revolve around the relationship between at
least two living, ascertained, specified persons-a guardian and a ward."
The inclusion of this heading in a comment dealing with unborn and unascertamed persons is justified on two grounds. First, it is necessary to compare the
use of the term "representation" in the law of guardianship with its use in
the other sections of this comment. Second, there is a small corner of the law
of guardianship which concerns itself with representation of unborn or unascertained persons.
The term "representation" is used in a broader sense in discussions of
the law pertaining to guardian and ward than it has been used in the previous
portions of this comment. As it has been used in the foregoing discussion,
"representation" has carried the connotation that joinder of a person referred to as the representative would result in the represented person's being
bound by the decree or judgment. The broader usage of the word in guardian
68
Urket v. Coryell, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 60 (1842) , Ashurst v. Given, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 323
(1843), Heyward-Williams Co. v. McCall, 140 Ga. 502, 79 S.E. 133 (1913), Folk v. Hughes, 100
S.C. 220, 84 S.E. 713 (1915), IA BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 59, § 163; See also PERRY, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 66 (7th ed., Baldes, 1929)
"J1A BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 59, § 163.
7090 F.2d 18 (8th Cir. 1937)

7'See note 62 supra.

"See 5 BANCROFT'S PROBATE PRACTICE §§ 1269-1273 (2d ed., Hillyer, 1950)
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and ward law is exemplified by the rules (1) that a guardian may "represent" the ward in a legal proceeding, yet the judgment of that proceeding
may not be binding on the ward,7 3 and (2) that the ward may be joined as
a party yet not be bound by the judgment if not "represented." 7 4 The apparent inconsistencies of these statements may be resolved by reference to
the code sections applicable in these cases.
Probate Code section 1400 defines the guardian-ward relationship. Civil
Code section 42 provides that a minor may engage in litigation in the same
manner as an adult, except that a guardian must conduct the minor's side
of the litigation. Probate Code section 1501 imposes on the guardian the
duty to appear for and represent his ward unless another person is appointed
for that purpose. Code of Civil Procedure section 372 states when a guardian
ad literm may be appointed, and Code of Civil Procedure section 373 sets
out the procedure for such appointment. Code of Civil Procedure section
411 requires that the summons in a case against a minor be served on the
minor personally and also on his parent or guardian.
The applicable rule to be derived from these code sections is that in an
action by or against a minor, the minor will not be bound by the judgment
or decree unless he is joined as a party and represented by a guardian or
guardian ad litem. Generally, even though joined as a party to the action, a
minor has a right to disaffirm the judgment if not represented by a guardian
or guardian ad litem.75 Conversely, except in certain probate proceedings,7"
a minor who is purportedly represented by a guardian ad litem is not bound
unless personally served with summons. 7" But where a general guardian appears for the minor, the court may have jurisdiction over the ward despite
nonservice of summons."8 From these statements it may be seen that the
words "represent" and "representation" are used partly in the sense in which
they have been used elsewhere in this paper, and partly in the sense in which
they are used when one says that a lawyer represents his client.
Representation of Unborn or UnascertainedPersons by Guardian Ad
Litem-The segment of the law of guardianship which is of special interest
for this comment is that part dealing with guardians ad litem. It may be
"5 Johnston v. S. F. Savings Union, 63 Cal. 554 (1883), see also Akley v. Bassett, 189 Cal. 625,
209 Pac. 576 (1922).
"'Gouanillou v. Industrial Accident Commission, 184 Cal. 418, 193 Pac. 937 (1920).
"'Johnston v. Southern Pacific Co., 150 Cal. 535, 89 Pac. 348 (1907) ; Gouanillou v. Industrial
Accident Commission, supra note 74; Neilson v. Walker, 105 Cal.App. 23, 286 Pac. 1091 (1930) ;
Field v. Hughes, 131 CaLApp. 144, 20 P.2d 990 (1933) ; Keane v. Penha, 76 Cal.App.2d 693, 173 P.2d
835 (1946) ; 2 ARmsToRNG, CALrioRmA FAMrLY LAW 1461 (1953).
"'CALIF. PROB. CODE § 1208.

"Johnston v. S. F. Savings Union, 63 Cal. 554 (1883) ; McCloskey v. Sweeney, 66 Cal. 53, 4 Pac.
943 (1884) ; Akley v. Bassett, 189 Cal. 625, 209 Pac. 576 (1922).
"Smith v. McDonald, 42 Cal. 484 (1871) ; Richardson v. Loupe, 80 Ca]. 490, 22 Pac. 227 (1889);
Redmond v. Peterson, 102 Cal. 595, 36 Pac. 923 (1894) ; 5 BANCaOFr's PROBATE PRACTICE § 1363.
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noted that Code of Civil Procedure sections 372 and 373, dealing with appointment of guardians ad litem, referred only to living, ascertained persons.
A guardian ad litem may not be appointed under such sections until the defendant minor is served with summons.79 These sections, and the others cited
above under this heading, are therefore not directly within the scope of this
discussion. In 1949 the California Legislature added to the Code of Civil
Procedure a section which is very much in point in this discussion. Code of
Civil Procedure section 373.5 provides:
"If under the terms of a written instrument or otherwise, a person or
persons of a designated class who are not ascertained or who are not in being,
may be or may become legally or equitably interested in any property, real
or personal, the court in which any action, petition or proceeding of any
kind relative to or affecting such property is pending, may, upon the representation of any party thereto, or of any person interested, appoint a suitable
person to appear and act therein as guardian ad litem of such person or
persons not ascertained or not in being; and the judgment, order or decree

in such proceedings, made after such appointment, shall be conclusive upon
all persons for whom such guardian ad litem was appointed."
Tus is a very significant addition to the list of procedures available
for the solution of the problem of unborn or unascertained persons. The
half dozen or so procedures discussed elsewhere in this comment will cover
most of the cases. But each of the other procedures has some possible "loophole"--some fact situation which may arise rendering that procedure inapplicable. Section 373.5 might well be called the "cure-all" statute for this
problem. It provides a procedure which will be available in seemingly all
of the cases involving this problem. This does not mean that it is the best
procedure to use in all cases, however. A guardian ad litem is naturally
entitled to compensation for his services. Appointment of a guardian ad
litem to represent unborn or unascertained persons in every case involving
interests limited to them would provide adequate protection for their interests
and would assure that the decree would not be subject to collateral attack by
them. But some estates become involved in much litigation. Repeated appointments of guardians ad litem could substantially diminish the very estate
which the guardian ad litem is appointed to protect. A better procedure would
be to rely on one of the other methods outlined here, where it is clear that
the procedure relied upon will provide adequate protection.
The terms of section 373.5 would seem to include the situation outlined
under the section on Joinder of Presumptive Takers above. A grants to B
for life, remainder in fee to the heirs of X, a living person. C is a presumptive
heir of X. The terms of section 373.5 indicate that appointment of a guardian
"McCloskey v. Sweeney and Akley v. Bassett, supra note 77, Redmond v. Peterson, supra note
78; Weisfield v. Superior Court, 110 Cal.App.2d 148, 242 P.2d 29 (1952).
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ad litem to represent the unascertained heirs of X in an action affecting the

fee, would render the judgment binding against C. It would seem to be better
procedure to join C as a party to the action.
Where the requisites for primary jurisdiction in an action in rem include joinder of all interested persons, the better procedure might be to
have a guardian ad liten appointed to represent any unborn or unascertained
remaindermen. This should forestall any possible complaint that all interested persons were not before the court.
If an unknown owner statute were held to apply only to living persons,
one invoking such a statute would be wise to insist on appointment of a
guardian ad litem if there should be unborn remaindermen involved, unless
of course, the virtual representation doctrine clearly would apply in the case.
The interests of unborn persons in partition actions under Code of Civil
Procedure sections 752 et seq., where property is ordered sold and the proceeds distributed, would seem to be sufficiently protected by the requirements
of sections 766 and 781. A guardian ad litem could be appointed under section 373.5, but such appointment would seem to be unnecessary.
The major weakness in the virtual representation doctrine is the possibility of adverse interests as between the alleged representative and the
unborn or unascertained person."0 This is perhaps the area where section
373.5 will be of greatest aid. Where the virtual representation doctrine is
clearly applicable, however, it would seem better to rely on it than to add
the expense of guardianship to the expenses of litigation.
Likewise, in cases involving conflict of interests between trust beneficiaries or between trustee and beneficiary, a guardian ad litem might be appointed to protect interests of unborn or unascertained remaindermen. Where
the trustee may clearly represent the unborn or unascertained persons, the
latter would seem to be the better procedure.
While this code section is probably not one which will be often used,
it is one which will be invaluable in those cases where the other procedures
are inapplicable. One minor question arises upon a reading of the section.
No provision was made for appointment of a guardian ad litem by the court
on its own motion. Possibly the courts have such power without a specific
statement of it. In Mabry v. Scott"' it was stated that courts have inherent
power to appoint guardians ad litem as an incident of jurisdiction. 2 But in
Moxley v. Title Insurance and Trust Co. it was stated that a guardian ad
litem for unborn persons could not be appointed in the absence of statutory
"County of Los Angeles v. Winans, supra note 5; Mabry v. Scott, supra note 26; MoXley v.
Title Insurance and Trust Co., supra note 1.
151 CaiApp.2d 245, 124 P.2d 659 (1942).

'See also Crawford v. Neal, 56 Cal. 321 (1880) ; In re Cahill, 74 Cal. 52, 15 Pac. 364 (1887).
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authority."3 The omission in section 373.5 to state that the court on its own
motion might appoint a guardian ad litem for unborn or unascertained persons seems to have some significance in view of the fact that specific provision
was made in sections 372 and 373 for appointment of a guardian ad litem
by the court on its own motion in cases involving living, ascertained persons.
Summary.
The purpose of this comment has been to explore the theories by which
a decree or judgment may issue in California, binding on unborn or unascertained persons who may have an interest in real property which is involved in a legal proceeding. This comment has touched on several such
theories. Some have been quite limited in applicability, e.g., actions in rem,
judicially ordered sale in actions for partition, and unknown owner statutes,
which are applicable only in specific types of actions, or only under strictly
statutory authority. Others have been very broad in scope, applying to widely
variant types of actions and fact situations, and often used to "fill the gaps"
left in other more limited procedures. Examples of these broader doctrines
are the common law virtual representation doctrine and the statutory provision for guardians ad item for unborn or unascertained persons. Taking
them all together, it might safely be said that no action could arise in California today which could not be decided because unborn or unascertained
persons could not be before the court. Further, the possibility of collateral
attack upon a decree by later born or ascertained persons should be slight,
limited mainly to cases where active fraud or collusion by an alleged representative has deprived the latecomer of protection of his interests. These
bases for binding effect of decrees as against unborn or unascertained persons may be of great importance to the practicing attorney in several ways.
Two which come to mind immediately are: (1) In preparation of a case
involving unborn or unascertained possible future interest owners, he must
guard against the possibility of those interests being "lost in the shuffle,"
thus rendering the resulting judgment subject to collateral attack should the
persons later be born or ascertained. (2) In title searches"4 and other proceedings arising after the original proceeding, he must ascertain whether
the earlier proceeding is binding on all possible interested persons.

"'In at least two states, courts may appoint guardians ad litem for unborn persons without statutory authority. Robinson v. Barrett, 142 Kan. 68, 42 P.2d 587 (1935) , Franklin v. Margay Oil Corp.,
519, 153 P.2d 486 (1944)
194 Okla.
"4See PATTON, LAND TITLES § 335; BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES §§ 331-336 (1953)

